Introduction
The Treaty of Rome makes no reference to monetary union or specific exchange rate arrangements. In 1968 Raymond Barre, then commissioner of the European Community (EC), wrote a proposal advocating tighter consultations ofmember governments concerning macroeconomic policy and in particular monetary policy. The celebrated Werner Report of 1970 was an outgrowth of Barre's ideas. Although this report set monetary union as the ultimate EC objective, it was careful to emphasize (1) preconditions in the form ofcoordinated policies and (2) the establishment of narrower margins of fluctuations around exchange rate par values. The so-called snake arrangement, instituted in 1972, was believed to be the Werner Report in action. In fact, from the Werner Report the "snake" system borrows only the idea of reducing currency fluctuations without setting a machinery to coordinate policies. The "snake" failed.
The decision taken in 1978 by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and President Giscard d'Estaing to create a "zone of monetary stability" came as a surprise, not only to the general public but also to central banks. Samuel Brit-tan (1979) speculated that the birth of the European Monetary System (EMS) had less to do with a desire for monetary stability than a Franco-German reaction to the weakness of the dollar and the unreliability of the Carter Administration. Whatever the reasons, the EMS became a reality on March 13, 1979.
Several authors predicted failure or at least modest success. Benjamin Cohen (1981, p.21) stated that "the potential for an inflationary CatoJournal, Vol.8, No.2 (Fall 1988) . Copyright © Cato Institute. All rightsreserved. The author is Professor of Business Economics and Public Policy at Indiana University. He gratefully acknowledges the commentsby Juergen von Hagen and Alan Walters on earlier versions of the paper.
bias is there and, unlike the hypothethical reverse danger of a deflationary bias, could well become serious in practical terms. -. -Any disciplinary effect of the joint float on a deficit member would probably be more than offset by the 'safety valve' of access to the credit facilities." In 1980, I predicted that "the EMS is destined to become an adjustable-peg system. How well this system will fare depends on the disparity ofinflation rates and timeliness ofparity adjustments.
The current disparity ofinflation rates and underlying policies among EEC countries suggests frequent realignments. Yet history teaches us that decisionmakers perceive parity changes as costly political decisions and, therefore, postpone taking action" (Fratianni 1980, p. 165) . Roland Vaubel (1980) identified in the EMS the emergence of "egalitarianism, collectivism, and etatism" and worried about the built-in moral hazard incentives and inflation bias.
The EMS has not failed. Many economists and policymakers consider it a success, partly on the strength of the evidence I will review in this paper. Yet, the relevant question is not whether the EMS has survived or done well according to some absolute criterion, but-whether it has performed better or worse than an alternative exchange rate regime. Needless to say, this is a demanding task because of the difficulty of holding other things constant.
In the remainder of the paper, I first compare the performance of the EMS countries both with the countries' own pre-EMS history and with non-EMS countries. Next, I consider the workings and merit of the EMS relative to the free-floating alternative. While there is a considerable amount of theoretical work on the relative desirability between an EMS-type and a free-floating arrangement (with and without credible monetary authorities), the empirical work bearing on this proposition is still in its infancy. In the concluding section, I offer speculations concerning the motives of each EMS country in being part oft-he present arrangement.
The Record
This section reviews the EMS record on exchange rate variability, inflation rates, money growth, interest rates, and economic growth.
Exchange Rates
There have been 11 parity changes or realignments during the life of the EMS; 7 occurred during the first four years and 4 in the subsequent four years (see Appendix Table 1 ). In the approximately 8-year period from March 1979 to January 12, 1987, the Italian lira experienced the largest parity depreciation, 45 percent, vis-à-vis the Deutsche mark; the Dutch guilder had the smallest depreciation, 4 percent (see Appendix Table 2 ). ' Did these parity changes evolve to take into consideration inflation differentials within the EMS countries? In Appendix Tables 3 and  4 , I have shown cumulative bilateral inflation rate differences-over the period of 1979-86-measured by percentage changes of the wholesale price index and the consumer price index, respectively. Italy, again, has had the highest inflation differential in relation to Germany (64 and 84 percentage points, respectively); the Netherlands, the smallest (1 and 3 percentage points, respectively). A comparison of Appendix Table 2 with Appendix Tables 3 and 4 reveals that bilateral depreciations were positively associated with a higher domestic inflation rate.
2 This positive association, however, was far from being complete and left room for real exchange rate changes (sec Appendix Table 5 ). In particular, the French franc, the Italian where Exr = nominal exchange rate; wpi = wholesale price index; cpi = consumer price index. Horst Ungerer eta1. (1986) give detailed evidence about exchange rate variability within the EMS countries, within the non-EMS countries, and between them. Here are the salient results of this study. First, intra-EMS exchange rate variability-both nominal and real-declined after the creation of the EMS. This decline is particularly so for bilateral exchange rates, which is evidence that corroborates the earlier study by Kenneth Rogoff (1985) who had, instead, concentrated on predictability. The evidence shows that the variance of the forecast error of the risk-neutral rational expectations model was lower during the first five years of the EMS than during the preceding five years. In contrast, non-EMS exchange rate variability went up after the creation ofthe EMS.
Much more subtle is the evidence concerning the interaction between EMS and non-EMS countries. On the basis of the IMF's multilateral exchange rate model, there is little evidence in Ungerer et al. to suggest that the pre-EMS period behaves different from the post-EMS period.
4 As an alternative, I computed the standard deviation and the coefficient of variations ofthe annual percentage change of the effective exchange rate as defined by the OECD (see below for a description ofthe data). My computation was for the seven EMS countries; three European non-EMS countries (Austria, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland); and three non-European countries (Canada, Japan, and the United States). The results, presented in Appendix Table 6 , indicate a sizeable increase in variability for two of the EMS countries (Belgium and the Netherlands) in contrast to the rather stable pattern in non-EMS countries. This fact implies that part ofthe gain in reduced exchange rate variability within the EMS countries came at the expense of a higher variability of exchange rates between EMS and non-EMS countries.
5
Why has there been a significant decline in the growth rate ofintra-EMS trade after 1979, in relation to both its own past and to non-EMS trade growth, despite the achieved lower (within the EMS) exchange rate variability?
6 De Grauwe and Verfaille (1987) tackle   4 See Tables 28 and 29 in Ungerer et al. (1986) . 5 1n support of this point Ungerer et al. (1986, Table 7 ). The incompleteness ofmoney data for Denmark and France, however, prevents us from making statistically relevant comparisons between EMS and non-EMS aggregates. As an alternative to the money stock, I considered the growth rate of the monetary base, which has the advantage of closely reflecting the policy actions of the central banks.'°In Appendix Table 8 , I report the sample averages of the annualized growth rate of the monetary base of each EMS country and the relative growth rates of each as defined by the difference of the country's growth rate and by the growth rate of the EMS aggregate, excluding the country in question.
5 These weights are Belgium = 1.1, Denmark = 0.7, France = 7.0, Germany = 8.5, Ireland = 0.2, Italy = 4.5, Netherlands = 1.8, Austria = 0.9, United Kingdom = 6.3, Switzerland = 1.2, Canada = 3.9, Japan = 14.0, United States = 40.9.°T hefollowing t statistic was employed:
where std = [nj*varl + 05 Italy and Ireland experienced significant (but at the relatively high 20 percent confidence level) declines in the growth of the monetary base; France, in contrast, had an increase in the relative growth. The interplay ofthese forces within the EMS left the EMS monetary base growth in the 1979-86 period virtually unchanged with respect to the pre-EMS period."
Interest Rates
Integration ofthe financial markets implies that, in the absence of expected real exchange rate changes, real rates of interest cannot differ among countries. Rogoff (1985) shows that the difference between German and French and between German and Italian shortterm real interest rates increased during the EMS period. Furthermore, the conditional variance ofthese interest rates-based on two alternative ways to proxy the expected rate of inflation-rose as well in the post-EMS period.' 2 Giavazzi and Pagano (1985) present evidence that the spread between offshore and onshore interest rates widens and becomes more variable when an expectation of a parity realignment sets in. By tying the evidence produced by Giavazzi and Pagano with that of Rogoff, one arrives at the conclusion that the reduced variability of the exchange rates cannot be credited to coordinated monetary policy, but rather to the existence ofcapital controls that have effectively put a wedge between German interest rates, on the one hand, and French and Italian interest rates, on the other hand. Charles Goodhart (1986) , on the strength of this evidence, argues against the entry ofthe United Kingdom in the EMS, because the crucial role of London as a major financial center requires freedom ofcapital movement.' 3 To put it differently, if the cost ofjoining the EMS is the application of exchange controls, the EMS is not worth it.
The evidence on interest rates cited above was based on data going up to 1984. What has happened more recently? The most important development is the exchange liberalization process that has taken place both in Italy and France. This liberalization forces the real interest rates in these countries to rise relative to those abroad. In Appendix Table 9 , I have calculated the short-term real rate of interest using two alternative data sets: the annual data of the OECD, and liThere is a slowdown in the growth rate ofthe monetary base ofthe 'Crest ofthe world," but it is not statistically significant. We should note that the growth rate of the monetary base has large variances in all countries, a fact that explains why apparently large drops in the sample means are not statistically significant. 12 See Appendix Table 5 . 0 rejects the EMS on these grounds, as well as on political-economy considerations.
the monthly three-month Treasury rates published by Harris Bank's Weekly Review. In both instances I have assumed that individuals were blessed with perfect foresight as to the next period's rate of inflation. While the two data sets yield different quantitative results, qualitatively they concur in pointing to a narrowing of the differentials.
The narrowing of the interest-rate differential is consistent with the hypothesis that countries like France and Italy have used the exchange rate as an exogenous variable and have adopted a policy of letting their domestic currencies appreciate in real terms vis-à-vis the Deutsche mark.
Economic Growth and Unemployment
How have the EMS countries performed on the real side of the economy? The evidence is very clear concerning unemployment, less so about output growth. Unemployment rates have increased substantially in the post-EMS period: In each of the EMS countries the increase is statistically significant at the 5 percent level (see Appendix Table 10 ). But this statement is also true for the other three European countries that are not part ofthe EMS, in contrast with the experience of the Canada-Japan-U.S. group. The unemployment story does not carry over, however, to the growth of real GNP where the slowdown is statistically significant for France, Ireland, and the Netherlands. We should note that the growth rates of output in the 1974-78 period were low to begin with, making the economic slowdown even more pronounced. The nature and size of the real slowdown in Europe is very controversial and is the subject of ongoing research. One critical issue is whether the higher unemployment results from high real wage rates (classical explanation) or from inadequate spending (Keynesian explanation). We should note that unemployment in Europe is largely concentrated among the young and the unskilled, particularly in well-defined geographical areas. In a recent paper Jacques Dreze et al. (1987) argue that European unemployment exhibits both classical and Keynesian characteristics. These economists propose a series of supply-side measures aimed at reducing the high wedge between the private cost of labor (inclusive of taxes) and the social cost (i.e., net of tax). But they also propose that Germany, France, and the United Kingdom should generate additional government spending for future expansion ofproductive capacity, which is currently almost fully used.' 4 ' 4 The proposal entails higher public debt today and more taxes in the future. The higher public debt today serves to induce an intertemporal substitution of labor away from the future (when the economy will be at full employment) and toward the present (when resources are unemployed).
From the perspective of this paper the above discussion highlights that the EMS is a monetary arrangement, not a fiscal one. Indeed there is evidence that fiscal policies among the EMS countries were more divergent after 1979 than before.
An Interpretation of the EMS
The EMS was created to achieve "a zone of monetary stability in Europe" that would eventually culminate into the establishment of a European Monetary Fund. Central banks have interpreted "a zone ofmonetary stability" to mean (1) lower variability ofexchange rates, and (2) lower and converging inflation rates among EMS countries.
The EMS has been successful in reducing nominal and real exchange rate variability. Yet, intra-EMS trade growth has fallen. It is conceivable that trade growth would have fallen even more with more exchange rate variability. As to inflation, the facts are more ambiguous. The achieved reduction in the inflation rates turns out to be not as significant as the reduction in inflation rates among non-EMS countries when the entire post-EMS period is considered. If, instead, one isolates the 1982-86 period, the story becomes much more favorable for the EMS. Finally, there is some evidence that France and Italy have used the EMS as a disinflationary mechanism, by letting their currencies appreciate in real terms vis-à-vis the Deutsche mark and letting their real rates of interest rise relative to the real rates of interest prevailing in Germany.
Two questions immediately come to mind. Why would France and Italy accept the discipline of the EMS in preference to appropriate domestic disinflationary policies? Why would Germany be part of a scheme that makes it a potential importer of inflation? The rest of the paper is devoted to answering these two questions.
The Reputation Hypothesis
The key issue underlying the first of the two questions is whether or not membership in the EMS facilitates disinflation relative to an independent policy of disinflation. High-inflation countries may find itworthwhile tojoin an EMS-type arrangementbecause ofthe benefit derived by linking their currencies to that of a low-inflation country. These benefits stem from the reputation that the low-inflation country's central bank has earned in the market place.
A central bank with little or no reputation faces an inflation rate higher than would prevail if the central bank had committed itself to a credible strategy of~This central bank can borrow reputation by committing its country's currency to a policy of real exchange rate appreciation with respect to the currency of a lowinflation credible central bank. The EMS can be interpreted as an arrangement of this type, with the relatively high-inflation countries of France and Italy borrowing reputation from low-inflation Germany. Giavazzi and Pagano (1986) explore theoretically the advantage of high-inflation countries oftying their hands as far as monetary policy is concerned. The critical point for these economists is not whether the EMS is an effective disciplinary force, but whether the highinflation countries gain from the arrangement.
The gain ofreputation is only one aspect ofjoining the EMS; highinflation countries also have to consider the losses in competitiveness implied by real exchange rate appreciations. The Giavazzi-Pagano model postulates that monetary authorities prefer more outputto less output, value a positive rate of inflation because it creates revenues, but dislike inflation variability because of its adverse effects on output. The latter responds positively to real exchange rate depreciation and inflation "surprises."
Finally, the real exchange rate of the high-inflation countries appreciates between realignments, but returns to its initial value at the time of a realignment (i.e., changes in parities are set equal to cumulative inflation differentials). Under these conditions, the EMS is worth joining if the authorities do not seek to extract revenues from inflation, an intuitive outcome. Equally intuitive is the result that the payoff ofjoining the EMS is ambiguous if the authorities value the inflation tax. The final outcome depends on the relative strength of the seigniorage, the present value of output loss because of inflation variability, and the tightness of the EMS regime. Unfortunately, no empirical measures of the three forces are critical in the determination of EMS membership. Only through revealed preference can we deduce that the seigniorage incentives are small enough, relative to the gain in reputation, to have made it worthwhile for France and Italy to remain in the EMS so far.
Benefits to the Supplier ofReputation
Let us turn to the second question raised earlier: What does Germany gain by being in the EMS? Participation in the EMS poses a ' 5 There is one branch of the literature on reputation that considers conditions under which policy shifts are credible (e.g., Barro and Gordon 1983) , while another branch emphasizes that the central bank is free to follow discretionary policies and determine its level of credibility (e.g., Cukierman and Meltzer 1986) . The latter view does not make it clear that the EMS enjoys a comparative advantage in generating reputation over an independent monetary policy of disinflation. complex problem to Germany. As a supplier of monetary credibility the Bundesbank receives no reward from the EMS. In fact, the workings of the EMS make it "natural" for Germany to import inflation from high-inflation countries. On the other hand, the EMS makes it possible for the Deutsche mark (DM) to have smaller real appreciations than would be true under free floating.
This competitive advantage may justify why the German government has been more favorable toward the EMS than the Bundesbank. The Bundesbank does not have exclusive authority to set priorities for the economy as a whole. In reality there are conflicts within branches of the executive. Germany, as represented by the Ministry of Finance, is more favorable to a DM real depreciation than Germany represented by the Bundesbank (see Tsoukalis 1987) . By German law, the Ministry of Finance, not the Bundesbank, decides the exchange rate arrangement. Indeed, as I mentioned before, Chancellor Schmidt's original decision tojoin the EMS-against the opposition of the Bundesbank-might have had less to do with monetary unification than with searching for an expedient way to diffuse the brunt of heavy speculative flows into Germany (Brittan 1979) .
The EMS may generate another benefit for Germany: the integration of financial markets in Europe and, hence, smaller German vulnerability to changes in foreign economic policy. It is not surprising that German authorities have consistently pushed for the integration of financial markets, with France and Italy relaxing exchange controls. The unfolding oftighter financial integration ought to raise the substitutability between DM-denominated assets and assets denominated in French francs and in liras. The benefit for Germany will be less vulnerability to changes in U.S. economic policies.' 6
Evidence on Reputation Giavazzi and Giovannini (1987) address the issue ofhow important reputation has been in the EMS. They test for the empirical size of reputation by employing the famous Lucas (1979) critique to econometric practice in a positive manner. Since the institution ofthe EMS represents a new policy regime, it follows that any well-specified model of inflation estimated before the EMS will tend to overpredict inflation during the EMS period for countries borrowing reputation and to underpredict for reputation-supplying Germany. Giavazzi and Giovannini estimate vector-autoregressive models that act as "idealized" reduced-form equations for changes in the price level, nominal ' 6 The asymmetries noted by Giavazzi and Pagano (1985) will have then disappeared.
wages, and output. These variables are postulated to depend on their lagged values, money growth, changes in the relative price ofimported raw materials, and changes in the relative price of imported finished goods, as well as on a smattering ofcountry-specific dummy variables.
The authors find only one significant change in the overall values of the estimated coefficients before and after the establishment of the EMS; that change occurs for the French price inflation. As Giavazzi and Giovannini admit (p. 16), "This result might suggest that the EMS has not brought about any of the changes in expectations that we describe in the sections above, except for the price equation in France." Since the authors do not provide statistics about the relative forecast accuracy of the models before and after the EMS, the issue ofthe effectiveness ofthe regime change cannot be explored more deeply.
What we are left with are graphs of the actual and predicted values of the models in the post-EMS period. These graphs, in the absence of formal statistics, become the evidence upon which Giavazzi and Giovannini evaluate the reputation hypothesis. The graphs for Danish and German inflation "appear" to be consistent with the hypothesis. Besides importing inflation from the other EMS countries, Germany also seems to be a loser on the real side of the economy.
This conclusion runs counter to the popular notion that Germany is a deflationary force on the system. Curiously enough, the United Kingdom appears to have been able to have its cake and eat it too with systematic negative forecast errors in the inflation rate and with positive forecast errors in output. This result at face value vindicates Mrs. Thatcher's insistence in not being part of the EMS; and it is consistent with Alan Walter's (1986) assessment of the EMS.
Bundesbank Leadership
There is virtual unanimity in the literature that, despite the intentions of the founding fathers to create a democratic institution, the EMS behaves as if Germany were a price leader.
France has been more than vociferous in denouncing the dominant role of Germany. In January 1987, France refused to intervene as the franc fell to the compulsory intervention floor; the Bundesbank had to intervene. Inspired by France, the finance ministers of the EC in September 1987 modified the rules governing interventions andtheir financing. ' 7 ' 7 Masera (1987) outlines the principal institutional changes of the September 12-13,
1987, decision by the EC Council of Finance Ministers. In addition to the change
The key change concerns the access of weak-currency countries to automatic credit through the Very Short-term Financing Facility. Mr. Balladur, the French finance minister, has interpreted the change as meaning "a presumption of automaticity" (an oxymoron?), whereas Mr. Poehl has interpreted the September decision as giving the Bundesbank the discretion to decide each case on its merit, the criterion being that "the main pre-condition will be that it does not threaten price stability in Germany" (The Economist 1987). It is too early to judge whether the institutional innovations pushed by France and backed by other countries will nudge the Bundesbank to alter its monetary policy. Much will depend on the Bundesbank's ability to sterilize interventions in the exchange markets.
Conclusion
The European Monetary System has not failed. The potential for an inflationary bias predicted by many economists has not materialized. So much is clear. Less clear is the matter of whether the EMS has been a success. The evidence marshalled in this paper indicates that the EMS has achieved lower exchange rate variability. Yet, intra-EMS trade growth has declined. The reduction in inflation rates, greatly praised by proponents of the EMS, turns out to be modest when compared to the reduction achieved by other countries. The stronger evidence pertains to the willingness ofhigh-inflation France and Italy to have used the EMS as a disinflationary mechanism. The real value ofthe franc and the lira has appreciated in relation to the mark, while the wedge between German real interest rates, on the one hand, and French and Italian real interest rates, on the other hand, has shrunk. The early reliance of France and Italy on exchange controls has given way to later efforts to open up their financial markets.
The preference of France and Italy to join the EMS over a domestically driven disinflation suggests that the Banque de France and Banca d'Italia are relatively weak institutions and lack the reputation of the Bundesbank. By committing themselves to a policy of real exchange rate appreciations, France and Italy use the reputation of the Bundesbank in lowering the inflation rate at a lesser cost than would be possible through an independent monetary policy. discussed in the text, there is a time extension ofthe Very Short-term Financing Facility; a larger role given to the "official" ECU; and an engagement to monitor exchange rates, external imbalances, and monetary conditions in each of the EMS countries. The decision was written with unusually guarded language.
German participation in the EMS is problematic. The Bundesbank supplies credibility to the system but gains virtually nothing. As we have shown, the impetus to join the EMS came from the German government, not from the Bundesbank. The government has supported the EMS because the arrangement has provided for smaller real appreciations of the Deutsche mark than under a regime of free floating. Germany also benefits from the integration of European financial markets, giving it a further justification for joining and remaining in the EMS.
Belgium, Luxembourg, the. Netherlands, and Denmark are small countries that have embraced, to different degrees, a Deutsche mark standard, The United Kingdom has refused to join the EMS for fear of losing independence of monetary policy. The evidence reviewed in this paper does not indicate that the United Kingdom has lost by staying out. Ireland, a small country not linked to the Deutsche mark area, remains a puzzle as to its gain from EMS participation.
The EMS so far has run as a German-dominated system. While there are pressures to make the arrangement more democratic, it is too early to predict any fundamental changes. However, should democratization come about without an adequate amount of shared reputation, a great deal of the raison d'être of the EMS would have disappeared.
Appendix Tables
The following tables provide information on the performance of the EMS since its inception in 1979. Performance is viewed both within the EMS and relative to non-EMS countries. The data pertain to exchange rate variability, monetary growth and inflation, real interest rates, economic growth, and unemployment. A positive number indicates a real depreciation of the country's currency shown in the column heading with respect to the country's currency shown in the row heading. The real exchange rate changes were obtained by subtracting the cumulative inflation differences of Appendix Table 3 and Appendix The first three columns refer to the annual percentage change of the monetaly base of the indicated countly; the second three columns refer to the difference between the country's growth rate and that of the rest of the EMS. Rest of the world is defined as the weighted sum of Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
*Statistically different from zero at the 5 percent significance level (t distribution, 49 degrees of freedom). ***5~~jsfiCally different from zero at the 20 percent significance level (t distribution, 49 degrees offreedom). 'Austria, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland. bCanada, Japan, and the United States.
*Statistically different from zero atthe 5 percent significance level (t distribution, 11 degrees of freedom). **Statistically different from zero at the 10 percent significance level (t distribution, 11 degrees of freedom).
,~, ***S~tjsticallydifferent from zero at the 20 percent significance level (t distribution, 11 degrees of freedom). 
A CRITICAL VIEW OF THE EMS

Alan Walters
'With the exception of one or two reservations, I find myself in substantial agreement with Michele Fratianni's paper. My main concern is that it did not provide a sharp and concise description of this reptilian descendant of the deceased snake. Let us try to fill this gap.
A Caricature of the EMS Clearly, the purpose ofthe European Monetary System (EMS) was to provide intermember exchange rate stability until the occasion of realignment. Let us therefore suppose that realignments take place at the end ofthe year, and that the EMS currencies have fixed exchange rates for that year. Let us also assume that there are no capital controls and no regulations inhibiting or taxing foreign acquisition offinancial assets. Then the fixed exchange rates will necessarily imply that nominal interest rates, for periods of maturity less than one year, will be equal. Arbitrage will ensure such equality.
To suffuse an air ofverisimilitude, let us suppose the two countries, Italy and Germany, are locked into this EMS-induced equality of interest rates. This equality will occur whatever the ambient rates of inflation in the two countries. Let us therefore suppose that the ambient rate of inflation in Italy is 10 percent and that Germany has stable prices. The common nominal interest rate, we may assume, is 5 percent.
This implies that the real interest rate in Germany is positive at 5 percent, whereas in Italy there is a negative real interest rate of 5 percent. Such interest rates are, of course, precisely the opposite of those that are required for reducing the rate of inflation in Italy and for promoting growth in Germany. With the short interest rate as the most important instrument of monetary control, the low real interest CatoJournal,Vol.8, No.2 (Fall 1988 rates in Italy would stimulate a rapid expansion of lira, whereas the high real rates in Germany would depress the demand for marks. Thus it appears that the EMS would induce monetary incentives that are exactly the opposite of those required for "harmonization" of inflation rates.
One may concede this point but argue that the domestic pressures on interest rates would surely give rise to a narrowing of the real interest rate gap. (One would also need to concede that there are costs of capital crossing frontiers to violate the one-price result of perfect arbitrage.) Let us imagine therefore that nominal rates are 3 percent in Germany and 7 percent in Italy. Although the real rates are plus 3 percent in Germany and minus 3 percent in Italy, there is still an incentive for owners of mark deposits to overcome the costs of capital crossing the Italian frontier since deposits in lira earn 7 percent, which can be converted at the end of the year to marks at the fixed exchange rate. Thus the pressure is for capital to move from Germany to Italy. This is the reverse of an equilibriating flow of reserves. Again it will enhance the disparity in inflation rates. (One of the effects of the automaticity, which was recently negotiated, is to make sure official capital flows quickly offset the private flows.)
With monetary policy so emasculated, the main weight of adjustment must be taken over by fiscal policy that is aided and abetted by direct controls over wages and prices. To contain and reduce the inflation in Italy, tight fiscal policies would cause unemployment to rise. Again one would expect disparate fiscal policies-and Fratianni has observed evidence of this during 1979-87.
This pure fixed exchange rate system is, of course, a caricature of the EMS. In particular, there is considerable room (2.25 percent and, for Italy, 6 percent) within which the exchange rates can move from the central parity. Furthermore, the realignments ofnew parities can come at unexpected times. All these considerations blur the perversity we outlined in the pure caricature. But, at the same time, they destroy the one advantage ofthe EMS: namely, the fixity of exchange rates in the short run.
Fratianni says that the members of the EMS now regard it not as a short-run stabilizer, but as a mechanism aimed at "preventing high variability of exchange rates." But, as he points out, the reduction in variability within the EMS was eroded by a higher variability between the EMS and non-EMS countries. There is little enough stability to credit to the EMS account.
Speculation, Capital Movements, and Reputation
One of the frequent claims is that the EMS reduces speculation against currencies. It is, of course, very difficult to know precisely
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what this claim means. But surely the EMS process ofrealignmentsas in the devaluations of the franc and lira and the revaluation of the mark-provides the most risk-free speculation for any asset owner. Everyone knows the approximate date and direction of the change. It is not surprising that overnight interest rates ofthe franc shoot skyhigh as investors borrow to bet on such a sure thing. I suspect that the opportunity to join periodically in such a sure thing against sterling may explain some of the enthusiasm in the City of London for Britain joining the exchange rate mechanism.
The pressure of capital movements in the EMS and the difficulty of maintaining exchange rates encourage resorting to other methods for reducing the pressure. Both Italy and France have maintained capital controls and exercise considerable restrictions over domestic credit markets. Attempts to abolish capital controls and to deregulate domestic capital markets have yet to be realized. One suspects also that the increased trade barriers in Europe, compared with the sharp decreases in the 1970s, have been in part due to the pressures of the EMS.
On the issue ofreputation and discipline, Fratianni nicely confirms my own conjectures.
1 Before 1979, the main European nation outside the EMS, the United Kingdom, grew at halfthe rate ofGermany and France, but since the recession of 1982, it has grown at twice the rate of Germany and France. British unemployment has been falling dramatically for three years, whereas in Germany, France, and Italy it is still increasing. The reduction in inflation has been quite as impressive as in those countries in the EMS. But I would attribute this British renaissance not entirely to its freedom from EMS entanglements, as in the study of Giavazzi and Giovannini, but primarily to Mrs. Thatcher. I refuse to regard Mrs. Thatcher as simply a realization of a random variable. She is neither random nor variable.
Politicization of Exchange Rates
Compared with a floating system, the EMS entails a considerable politicization ofexchange rates. The occasion for realignments involves a great political bargaining session rather than an occasion on which to review the fundamentals of real exchange rates. The French denouncing the dominant role ofGermany and the attempts to make the Bundesbank pursue more inflationary policies seem to point to a political Achilles' heel. Any departure from German hegemony would, as Fratianni hints, make a nonsense of what little rationale there is for the EMS. 'See WaIters (1986, chap. 7) .
The Currency Board Alternative
If the ultimate objective is the monetary integration of Europe through a European Central Bank (ECB) in a single currency area, then the EMS seems to be hardly a step in the right direction. It creates too many tensions, both economic and political. On the other hand, it is possible to develop sensible institutional arrangements that would usher in the integrated monetary system. One such institution, with massive historical precedent, is the currency board arrangement. Using the Bundesbank as the de facto ECB, member nations would hold 100 percent mark reserves against their own currency issues and would, at all times, exchange their currency against marks at a fixed rate. Such a fixed-rate system would provide automatic adjustments ofthe money supply to support the fixed rates. But, as everyone would agree, such integration is far beyond the bounds of the politically possible.
I can agree with Fratianni that the EMS "has not failed," but only in the sense that it has not broken down in mutual acrimony. In every other sense, which he examines so patiently, I would regard the EMS as a failure.
